Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Richard Cartwright and Penelope Maddy

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77 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
'Forcing' can produce new models of ZFC from old models [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
A Large Cardinal Axiom would assert ever-increasing stages in the hierarchy [Maddy]
New axioms are being sought, to determine the size of the continuum [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Extensional sets are clearer, simpler, unique and expressive [Maddy]
The Axiom of Extensionality seems to be analytic [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
The Axiom of Infinity states Cantor's breakthrough that launched modern mathematics [Maddy]
Infinite sets are essential for giving an account of the real numbers [Maddy]
Axiom of Infinity: completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
The Power Set Axiom is needed for, and supported by, accounts of the continuum [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
The Axiom of Foundation says every set exists at a level in the set hierarchy [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice have failed [Maddy]
Modern views say the Choice set exists, even if it can't be constructed [Maddy]
A large array of theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice [Maddy]
The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Axiom of Reducibility: propositional functions are extensionally predicative [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The Iterative Conception says everything appears at a stage, derived from the preceding appearances [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size is a vague intuition that over-large sets may generate paradoxes [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy]
Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Henkin semantics is more plausible for plural logic than for second-order logic [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
'Propositional functions' are propositions with a variable as subject or predicate [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy]
If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Cantor and Dedekind brought completed infinities into mathematics [Maddy]
Completed infinities resulted from giving foundations to calculus [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
For any cardinal there is always a larger one (so there is no set of all sets) [Maddy]
An 'inaccessible' cardinal cannot be reached by union sets or power sets [Maddy]
Infinity has degrees, and large cardinals are the heart of set theory [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
Theorems about limits could only be proved once the real numbers were understood [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
The extension of concepts is not important to me [Maddy]
In the ZFC hierarchy it is impossible to form Frege's set of all three-element sets [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Frege solves the Caesar problem by explicitly defining each number [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Mathematics rests on the logic of proofs, and on the set theoretic axioms [Maddy]
Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy]
Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy]
Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy]
A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver]
Unified set theory gives a final court of appeal for mathematics [Maddy]
Set theory brings mathematics into one arena, where interrelations become clearer [Maddy]
Identifying geometric points with real numbers revealed the power of set theory [Maddy]
Making set theory foundational to mathematics leads to very fruitful axioms [Maddy]
The line of rationals has gaps, but set theory provided an ordered continuum [Maddy]
Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy]
Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Scientists posit as few entities as possible, but set theorist posit as many as possible [Maddy]
Maybe applications of continuum mathematics are all idealisations [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
We can get arithmetic directly from HP; Law V was used to get HP from the definition of number [Maddy]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Science idealises the earth's surface, the oceans, continuities, and liquids [Maddy]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]